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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mother of Exiles “[c]ries . . . [w]ith silent lips, ‘[g]ive me
your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled masses, yearning to breathe free,
[t]he wretched refuse of your teeming shore.’” 1 The words of Emma
Lazarus have, since 1883, captured the vision of what America is
supposed to be: an immigrant state welcome to all comers. Yet, despite
the warmth and optimism expressed in “The New Colossus,” the
words are in some sense a forgotten ideal. Although we imagine that
the advance of time brings progress, one may find that in the case of
immigration policy we have suffered a regression. Lady Liberty was
more receptive to immigrants in 1883 than she is in 2018.
This, of course, is not to say that the past was in any way idyllic,
that racism was not far more rampant then than at present, nor that
the law lacked highly discriminatory provisions. Both society and the
law have greatly improved. However, the fact remains that in 1883 the
flow of immigrants into the country was highly unrestricted, and the
law often encouraged immigration—despite a few restrictions which
are sources of national shame, and aberrant to the general structure of
the old system. 2
Today, rather than taking in people of all backgrounds,
wherever they may come from, the law and its administrators pick and
choose who is let into the country. 3 Every year, millions of people wait

EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 operated as a general exception to
America’s open immigration policy and barred any further immigration from China.
Likewise, the Naturalization Act of 1790 barred immigrants of non-European origin
from naturalizing and becoming citizens. However, neither act comprehensively
regulated the flow of immigration itself. See WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL’Y
CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY
1–4
(2012),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/opport
unity_exclusion_011312.pdf [hereinafter “OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION”]
(detailing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Naturalization Act of 1790 and
the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798).
3 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin (Sept.
2017) (setting exact limits on the issuance of visas, based on region, familial
1
2
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in line to gain admission to the U.S., and some of them end up waiting
decades for green cards. 4 In fact, a very recent article revealed that
some green card applicants will have to wait over one-hundred and
fifty years for admission. 5 They are delayed because each year the U.S.
only admits a few hundred thousand of each category of immigrants.
Admissions are based on arbitrary statutory determinations of what the
country and its citizens need, and not the demand for various kinds of
visas. These classifications are arbitrary because, despite their
appearance, they do not comport with the economic and familial needs
of the U.S. and its citizens, have been written for ease of
administration, and are rooted in the subjective value judgements of
the statute’s framers.
The law dictates what types of family members are “immediate
relative[s],” as well as what kinds and how many laborers and
professionals are useful and not detrimental to our economy. 6 The
number of visas provided to foreign workers, family members of U.S.
citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents are allocated accordingly.
Now, rather than finding refuge, safe harbor, and a new life in America,
the huddled masses must wait patiently outside the golden door,
hoping that the quota is large enough to admit them and that their
names will be called.
The delays created by the modern quota system, detailed in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), adversely impact all other
aspects of the immigration system. Naturally, long wait times and
stringent requirements to keep one’s visa classification encourage
illegal immigration. The system is so impractical that faithfully abiding
preference, and worker priority); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (detailing how limits on visa
issuance and preferences are to be calculated).
4
CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., GOING TO THE BACK OF
THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND WAIT TIMES, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. 3–4 (2013).
5 See David Bier, 150 Year Wait for Indian Immigrants With Advanced Degrees,
CATO INSTITUTE (June 8, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/150-yearwait-indian-immigrants-advanced-degrees (explaining that EB-2 applicants from
India will have to wait over 150 years, compared to Indian EB-1 and EB-3 applicants,
who will respectively have to wait 6 and 17 years for their green card applications to
become current).
6 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(A).
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by it creates too high of an opportunity cost. 7 It does not allow one
the flexibility one requires in order to make important decisions
relating to one’s career, family, or community life, because those
changes may alter one’s immigration status. By consequence, it may
often seem more practical for one to break the rules. 8 Although rates
of illegal immigration from Mexico have been down since the recession
of 2008—and the general rate of illegal immigration has remained
static 9—the specter of illegal immigration continues to exacerbate
concerns about border security, sovereignty, and health screening.
However, if the demand for visas was not perpetually out of step with
the supply, and the wait times to get a visa were not so egregious, then
the incentives to enter the country illegally, or without inspection,
would be drastically reduced. Further, without the quota, there would
be no need to sort people into various “preference” categories, based
on arbitrary determinations of the person’s economic value or familial
importance. Absent this—and the strategic, complicated application
schemes would-be immigrants must center their lives around—there
would also be less of an incentive to let one’s visa expire. One would
be able to maintain one’s status while still maintaining social and
economic flexibility.
There are few people, if any, who would assert that the
country’s immigration system is not broken. This is the common
consensus, even though many would disagree on what a better system
would look like or whether it should be more liberal or more restricted.
Many proposed reforms place too much of an emphasis on security
7
Walter A. Ewing, Symposium, Globalization, Security & Human Rights:
Immigration in the Twenty-First Century: From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating
Immigration to the United States 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 445, 450–52 (2005)
[hereinafter “Globalization, Security & Human Rights”].
8
While any immigration attorney may point out that there are serious
consequences to violating immigration laws, and that it is never wise to do so, it is
the actions people commonly feel compelled to take that indicate what the balance
of incentives are. In this case, harsh legal repercussions are often not enough to
dissuade violation of the law, because the law is itself too onerous to follow.
9
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RES. CTR., OVERALL NUMBER
OF U.S. UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS HOLDS STEADY SINCE 2009 5 (2016),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2016/09/31170303/PH_2016.09.20_Unauthorized_FIN
AL.pdf.
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and sovereignty and actually seek to exercise more control over
immigration flows. 10 These approaches are counterproductive.
Attempts to restrict immigration conflict with U.S. economic policy
and the broader trends and migratory incentives created by
globalization. 11 Yet, even among more liberal-minded reformers, most
assume that quotas must be a feature. Some suggest expanding the
number of people admitted in general, while others wish to change the
emphasis the INA places on various preference categories. 12 In
particular, there is a push to prioritize worker visa applicants over
family visa applicants, altering the focus of the immigration system. 13
These reformers ignore the fact that most immigration is driven by
economic push and pull factors that cannot be accommodated by a
system of central management. The flow of people must be allocated
naturally, otherwise, the needs of the U.S., its citizens, and immigrants
will not be met. A scant few reformers argue for a market-centered
model of immigration that is greatly unmanaged. Yet, they are often
left out of the popular dialogue, and occasionally fail to argue for the
complete abolition of quotas.
The imposition of any form of quota will always come at a high
cost to both immigrants and U.S. citizens. No mere adjustment of
quota sizes or changes to immigration priorities and preferences can
adequately address the issues with the U.S. immigration system. Truly
comprehensive reform requires the complete abolition of quotas as
well as any type of immigrant prioritization scheme; this is not to say,
however, that other laws and regulations relating to public safety,
public health, or criminal activity need to be abandoned. By first
assessing the failures of the present system, the causes of those failures,
Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 449–51.
Id.
12 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 201, 207 (2005); Meriam N. Alrashid, The
“Comprehensive” Immigration Reform: Only as Good as the Bureaucracy it is Built Upon,
Symposium, A New Year and the Old Debate: Has Immigration Reform Reformed Anything?,
13 NEXUS J. OPINION 29 (2007–2008).
13 See generally DARRELL M. WEST, BRAIN GAIN: RETHINKING U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2010). West argues that future immigration policy should
focus on recruiting bright and creative minds to drive economic growth, using what
he calls the “Einstein principle,” and move away from a family centered policy. Id. at
126–55 (explaining the Einstein principle).
10
11
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and the inadequacies of reform, this comment will demonstrate the
need for the abolition of quotas and preference categories. Then, using
pre-modern immigration policy as a guideline, it will attempt to show
that a feasible balance can be struck between the legitimate interests of
the state and unrestricted immigration flows, despite objections to the
contrary. Finally, this comment will put forward a model proposal for
comprehensive reform.
The first section of this comment provides a brief history of
U.S. immigration policy and its evolution from an open policy to a
restricted one. The next section outlines the basic structure of the U.S.
immigration system under the Immigration and Nationality Act and
also assesses the functionality of that system. That section also outlines
various attempts at immigration reform, their failures, and their
promises. The final section details the comment’s policy
recommendations and the shifts in cultural attitudes that would make
these policy changes possible.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION
The history of American immigration policy can largely be
divided into three eras: the founding through 1920, 1920 – 1965, and
1965 – present. During the first era, immigration was largely
unmanaged, despite several regulations concerning naturalization,
information, and processing. 14 Following international shifts in trade
and migration policy resulting from the Great War, the U.S. exerted
more control over immigration and migration. 15 Quotas were
introduced as a means of managing the flow of immigrants from places
that were seen as culturally and racially undesirable—achieving in
broad scope what the Exclusion Acts had attempted decades earlier. 16
Finally, amidst the civil rights movement, the quotas based on national
origins were abolished, and new quotas emphasizing family unity were
put in place. 17 However, recently, as national security has become a
greater concern, modern immigration reform has centered on
14
15
16
17

See OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 1–7.
See id. at 1, 4.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 5.
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enforcement of the immigration code and not on the justifications or
sustainability of quotas. 18
A. The Era of Open Immigration
From 1790 until 1921, the United States Government made no
comprehensive attempt to manage the numbers of people entering,
settling, and working in the country. 19 Instead, early attempts at
regulation were more limited in scope: the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798 empowered the state to deport immigrants; 20 the Naturalization
Act of 1790 limited opportunities for citizenship to immigrants of
European descent; and the precursor to the Chinese Exclusion Act,
passed in 1875, limited the rights of criminals and prostitutes to
immigrate. 21 Only the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 ultimately barred
the further admission of Chinese immigrants, resulting in the egregious
deportation and dispossession of Chinese people residing in the
country. 22 But far from discouraging immigration itself, the nation’s
growth demanded its encouragement. The Homestead Act of 1862,
aiming to motivate westward expansion, actually incentivized
immigration to the United States. 23 This general condition of openness
did not change until the passage of the National Origins Quota Act of
1921. 24
B. The National-Origins Quota Era
The Chinese Exclusion Act could be considered a modern
immigration law, relating more to the present body of law than to the
general policy of open, quota-less immigration that preceded it. 25 It was
See id. at 7.
See id. at 2–4.
20
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, a supra note 2, at 2.
21 Id. See also, Jan C. Ting, Other Than a Chinaman: How U.S. Immigration Law
Resulted from and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 302–05 (1995) (detailing history of immigration
and Chinese exclusion); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
22 Id.
23
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 3–4.
24 Id.
25
Jan C. Ting even goes so far as to argue that modern immigration law is
the product of early attempts to restrict Chinese immigration, and identifies several
18
19
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the first time the state had attempted to regulate the flow of people
from one part of the world into the U.S. The core provisions of the
Act remained in effect until 1943, even when the 1790 restrictions on
naturalization were abandoned in 1906. 26 Yet, the first truly modern
immigration law was passed in 1921 and established quotas based on
national origin. 27 Between the administrative keenness of the
progressive movement, the new security measures imposed as a result
of the Great War, and several large waves of immigration stoking
nativist sentiment, the nation was finally moved to adopt a centrally
managed system of immigration. Under the new law, quotas were set
for immigrants to be accepted in varying proportion from different
regions of the globe based on their perceived cultural compatibility and
desirability. 28 In this sense, the new quota system was founded on the
same spirit as the Chinese Exclusion Act but applied in a more general
and expansive manner.
C. The Modern Era
The national origins quota system remained in place until
approximately 1952 but was not entirely replaced until the passage of
the Immigration Act of 1965. 29 In the spirit of the civil rights era, the
Act abolished the previous quota system which focused on national

vestiges of the exclusion in the current law, including: (1) restrictions on immigration
from countries whose total visa applications meet or exceed 7% of the total number
of immigrants allowed, adversely impacting Chinese applicants; (2) and the NP-5 and
OP-1 “diversity” visa programs, which underhandedly curbed Chinese immigration
and heavily favor Western European immigrants. Ting, supra note 21, at 308–09.
26 Id. at 305.
27
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 4.
28 Id. The Quota Law of 1921 established an overall allowance of 350,000
new immigrants per year, and fixed a maximum per-country cap of 3% the total
proportion of U.S. citizens from each country of origin as of the 1910 census; this
heavily favored European immigration, and most of the U.S. population was of
European descent. Id. The law also retained the bans on Asian and Chinese
immigration, but curiously exempted North American and Latin American nations
from the overall quotas. Id. The 1924 National Origins Act reduced the total
allowable number of new immigrants to 165,000 per year, and reduced the percent
of immigrants per-country to 2%, with the basis of that percentage being the 1890
census population (which was even whiter). Id.
29 Id. at 5.
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origins. 30 Not only was the national origins quota obsolete, it was racist
and arbitrary. 31 Instead, the INA enacted a system of preferences based
on familial relationships and various worker categories. 32 In this sense,
the new system attempted to direct immigration flows based on the
nation’s real interest. However, despite abandoning regional quotas,
the INA preference categories still sorted potential immigrants into
various groups and set quotas for each group according to formulas
which will be discussed in more detail later in the comment. 33
Despite the good intentions of the INA and subsequent
reforms, the system remains highly discriminatory due to the
mathematical realities of the quota system, population differences, and
varying demand for visas relative to preference categories. Barriers to
entry also contribute to “illegal” immigration, while border restrictions
transform temporary economic migrants into permanent settlers.
Beyond that, quotas continue to create large disparities between
domestic supply and demand for workers and divide families for years
at a time. People seeking to immigrate are only issued visas if the
allowance cap for their given category has not yet been reached. 34
Worse still, a change in age, employment, or marriage can alter a
person’s application category and send them to the back of a new
line. 35 As the years drag on, applicants can be separated from families
and are often left in periods of legal limbo. Employers miss
opportunities to hire useful people in a timely manner and are often
precluded from hiring the best because arbitrary preference categories
limit the availability of potential employees based on the nature of the
job or the skill it requires. As one might expect, the occupational
quotas are nearly always misaligned with the demands of the present
Id.
See id. at 5–6.
32 See id.
33 Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (allocating visas based on immigrant preference
categories).
34 See, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin (Sept.
2017) (setting exact limits on the issuance of visas, based on region, familial
preference, and worker priority); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (detailing how limits on visa
issuance and preferences are to be calculated).
35
CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. I,
GOING TO THE BACK OF THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND
WAIT TIMES 5–7 (2013).
30
31
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labor market. Likewise, while immediate family members of U.S.
citizens are not subject to quotas, the immediate family members of
Lawful Permanent Residents and all the extended family members of
either are subject to quotas. This leaves many good people deprived of
their loved ones based on ill-fitting legal definitions of “closeness.”
More recently, following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, there
has been a radical shift in the organization of the U.S. immigration
system. In 2002, former agencies which managed immigration, such as
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), were consolidated
and became the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 36 The
creation of the DHS embodies the new approach that the U.S. has
adopted regarding immigration. The primary concern of the state is
now national security and the enforcement of immigration laws. 37
Economic growth, labor interests, and family unity have become of
secondary importance. 38 This is in spite of the adoption of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. 39 While these policies were enacted
under the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration ultimately
deported record numbers of immigrants. 40 The current administration
has pushed for increased funding for the U.S. Border Patrol—another
sub-department of the DHS—and attempted to increase travel
restrictions from middle eastern countries. 41 Despite the issues created
by the quota system and management of visa allocation, these subjects
have failed to garner the attention they deserve in legislative and
administrative circles.

See, “Who Joined the DHS?” accessible at www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs.
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 7.
38
Ernie Garcia, National Security, Unskilled Labor, and Why the United States
Should Overhaul Its Immigration Policy, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 1043, 1055–56 (2010).
39 See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 451–53.
40
MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, SARAH PIERCE, & JESSICA BOLTER, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., THE OBAMA RECORD ON DEPORTATIONS: DEPORTER IN CHIEF OR
NOT?
(2017),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-recorddeportations-deporter-chief-or-not (indicating that President Obama deported
5,281,115 people over the course of eight years).
41
Caroline Kelly & Todd J. Gillman, Trump’s Plan for Border Patrol, ICE Hiring
Surges Face Timing, Security Obstacles, DALLAS NEWS (July 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/07/06/trumps-plan-borderpatrol-ice-hiring-surges-face-timing-security-obstacles.
36
37
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A good example of the government’s current emphasis on
immigration enforcement over constructive reform is perhaps the
recent parent-child separation scandal. While in the past practical
issues surrounding the detention of immigrants might have
occasionally led to the separation of detained parents or children, the
Trump administration sought to transform this into an official, zerotolerance policy. 42 It was thought that separating families of
immigrants apprehended at the border would deter illegal
immigration. 43 However, it did not dissuade many central American
refugees, who came to the U.S. seeking asylum. 44 In total, well over
two-thousand children were separated from their parents, and the
DHS is currently holding approximately two-thousand and fifty-three
of them. 45 Public outcry caused the administration to reconsider this
policy, and now children are detained alongside their parents. 46 The
INA was written to encourage family unity by prioritizing visas for
close family members. 47 While those particular provisions of the INA
are related to visa allocation and not immigration enforcement, this
episode illustrates the ways in which the government has recently put
the cart before the horse. The current administration consciously
attempted to divide families in order to enforce the law. Moreover,
these actions were a result of administrative guidance and orders from
the President rather than a product of legislation. 48 The structure of
the law has remained the same.

42 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: ZERO TOLERANCE—
PROSECUTION
AND
FAMILY
REUNIFICATION
(2018),
TOLERANCE
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/23/fact-sheet-zero-tolerance-prosecutionand-family-reunification.
43
Dara Lind, The Trump Administration’s Separation of Families at the Border,
(June
15,
2018,
12:03
PM),
Explained,
VOX
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/11/17443198/children-immigrant-familiesseparated-parents.
44 Id.
45
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42.
46 Id.
47 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (explaining
that it was the intent of Congress to protect familial unity).
48 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42.
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III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. The Current System’s Structure
The quota system is not perfect and has many problems.
Individual visa applicants wait for years to be approved for admission
into the U.S. There are also vast disparities between the number of
visas issued to each country and the demand for visas in particular
countries. While in part the general imbalance between visa supply and
demand can be explained by the size of the quotas themselves as well
as the number of visas allocated to each preference category, such
flaws are the result of the INA’s core architecture. Therefore, mere
adjustments to the number of visas available to be issued or to the
preferences which govern their issuance cannot fix the problems
caused by quotas, even if such adjustments may temporarily ameliorate
them. Moreover, the policies dictated by the INA, compounded by its
subsequent reforms, run counter to the other economic and trade goals
of the U.S. and are, in fact, exacerbated by these other goals. The
promotion of free trade and the embrace of globalization necessarily
spurs immigration. 49 Despite the good intentions of the framers and
reformers of the current law, the system is unfortunately set up to fail.
Immigration is fundamentally economic in nature. 50 However,
it has scarcely been viewed that way by lawmakers. Rather, it is often
viewed as a matter of law enforcement and, more recently, national
security. 51 To the extent that immigration is viewed as economic in
nature, it is often seen through a protectionist lens. 52 With the
exception of persons possessing extraordinary ability or international
renown, most worker visa applicants must show that they have an
employer waiting to hire them. 53 Further, the employer must show that

Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 445–46.
See id.
51
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 6–7.
52
Wadhia, supra note 12, at 207 (explaining that most comprehensive reform
proposals include strong measures protecting U.S. labor interests, workers’ rights,
and bargaining rights against competition from immigrants).
53 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1–3).
49
50
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there are no suitable domestic workers available to do the job. 54
However, the core emphasis of the INA is on familial unity, and the
vast majority of visas issued are allocated to foreign family members
of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents. 55 Economic
productivity and efficiency are a secondary goal at best. 56
The INA quotas are based on a framework of preference
categories which divide people into several different classes of family
members and prospective workers. 57 Each subclass of family members
and workers has its own base numerical limit and floor for visa
amounts. 58 However, the INA provides formulas for the reallocation
of visas from one preference category to another. In the event that a
given category is oversubscribed, visas can be reallocated from
another, undersubscribed category. 59 The numerical limit for each
category is calculated by adding and subtracting the amount of used or
unused visas from the previous fiscal year. 60 If the previous year’s
numbers drive the visa issuance limit for the following year too low,
some preference categories provide a minimum floor for available
visas. 61 For instance, the maximum number of family-based immigrant
visas issued each year is calculated by subtracting the number of
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3). With regard to this provision, it should also be
noted that waivers are available for skilled professionals, but not for unskilled and
agricultural workers. See, id. The added competition of imported labor is often viewed
as a threat to the wages and job security of domestic workers.
55
Darrel M. West takes particular issue with this, arguing that workers ought
to take priority, and that many of the economic problems associated with
immigration result from the policy emphasis on family unity rather than economic
productivity. West believes that the U.S. needs a greater proportion of skilled and
educated people entering the country, and that encouraging familial immigration
allows a higher proportion of less productive people to take their place. WEST, supra
note 13, at 126–55.
56
Note below, the difference between the number of available visas for the
various familial and employment-based categories. The September 2017 Bulletin
reported that a total of 226,000 visas were available for those waiting in the familial
preference categories, as opposed to only 140,000 for those in the employment-based
categories. U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 3.
57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153.
58 See id.
59 See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
60 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153(a).
61
8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1152.
54
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“immediate family members” admitted last fiscal year from the
480,000-visa ceiling and then adding the number of unused
employment visas left over from the last fiscal year. 62 In spite of this,
the total number of familial visas issued cannot fall below 226,000. 63
The quota formulas provided by the INA are neat, easily
calculable, and readily predictable from year to year. While this is
certainly administratively convenient, quota calculation is not a
scientific or rational practice. The quota formula’s logic is based on the
value judgements of the INA framers and subsequent reformers and
is not designed to align with the needs of the real world. Rather, what
is and is not preferable is a matter of opinion which, however well
informed at its inception, will inevitably fall out of step with present
conditions. For example, the decision to favor family relations over
economic productivity is a moral and sentimental determination.
To be scientific, each visa allocated must be directed toward
meeting the actual and specific needs of society. 64 However, this is
impossible because quotas and preference categories are stiff and
mechanical; they cannot anticipate the exact needs of people or the
proper balance of visas issued to any class of people because those
needs are always changing. The needs of society and the economy are
determined by the various and several needs of the individuals which
comprise it. 65 Put simply, the exact degree of benefit that can be
provided to an individual by the reunification with a particular family
member or to a business by the addition of a new employee cannot be

While “immediate” family members are exempt from the quota, their
admission into the country reduces the number of visas available to “nonimmediate” family members, who are subject to the quota. 8 U.S.C. §
1151(b)(2)(A)(i). It is also worth noting that there are almost never any employmentbased visas left over from the previous fiscal year. See Stephen H. Legomsky &
Cristina M. Rodríguez, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 260–62 (6th
ed. 2015).
63
8 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
64 Contra F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
passim (1945) (explaining that there can never be a scientific means of centrally
managed resource allocation because such allocation would require the use of
particular knowledge which it could never have).
65 See id. at 519–20.
62
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reasonably estimated by an abstract formula. 66 Knowledge of this kind
cannot be collected or aggregated and is specifically the province of
individuals. 67 “Need” is nearly impossible to define in general terms.
Economist Fredrich A. Hayek famously described why the
centrally managed allocation of resources was impossible without
omnipotence. 68 The price system (supply and demand), which he
ardently defended, made use of diffuse knowledge, never knowable to
a single individual at one time. 69 The issue with visa allocation is the
same, as visas are merely another commodity. The fundamental
problem with visas fixed by mathematical formulas is a problem of
forming a rational economic order. Since it is impossible to know who
will really make the best use of their visas, or even to define what the
“best use” is, it is impossible to create a properly functional means of
conscious visa allocation. As Hayek argued,
[t]he peculiar character of the problem of a rational
economic order is determined precisely by the fact that
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of
society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate
“given” resources—if “given” is taken to mean given
to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem
set by these “data.” It is rather a problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it
briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge
66
For that matter, the requirement that an employer determine that no
suitable local worker is available for hire ignores all of the potential, personal and
intangible reasons that may cause a given employer to favor a particular foreign
individual for the job. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (relating to the issuance of work-related
immigrant visas and visa requirements).
67
Hayek, supra note 64, at 519–20.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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not given to anyone in its totality. This character of the
fundamental problem has, I am afraid, been rather
obscured than illuminated by many of the recent
refinements of economic theory, particularly by many
of the uses made of mathematics. 70
Any appearance of scientific exactitude gleaned from the INA
formulas is illusory; it is “scientistic” rather than scientific. 71 Rather
than being rational, as they appear to be, quotas are irrational,
regardless of how neat the formulas are. When it comes to something
as ephemeral and particular as human need, a bureaucratic system of
management can never respond in such an attentive and appropriate
way as a market. The arbitrary nature of quotas is the major reason
why they consistently fail to remain in step with the demand for visas. 72
As people’s needs change, the types of visas they need change too, as
does the total amount of visas needed. These needs cannot always be
accommodated by the existing classes of visas or the number of visas
allocated to each category. The system is too rigid.
However, the arbitrary nature of quotas is not the only reason
that they fail to remain in step with visa demand. At the same time that
the U.S. has endeavored to stem the tide of immigrants at the border,
it has also pursued policies which make immigration more desirable
and more likely. 73 Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 and, a decade later, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 74 While the
former piece of legislation contained a large amnesty provision, it also
included penalties for employers who “knowingly” hired
undocumented immigrants. 75 The latter act greatly expanded the
grounds for inadmissibility and deportability under the INA by

Id. at 519–20.
F.A. Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec.r 11,
1974), in LUDWIG VON MISES INST., 2008, at 29, 29–31 (elaborating on the nature
and dangers of “scientism,” or that which pretends to be scientific).
72 Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 445.
73 Id. at 446–47.
74
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 6.
75 Id.
70
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broadening the definition of “aggravated felony.” 76 However, perhaps
somewhat mercifully, Congress also expanded the general quota in
1990 and added two new preference categories. 77 Nevertheless, since
the 1980s, the state has attempted to reform immigration by making
its laws more enforceable rather than more accommodating. Despite
the government’s best efforts, the number of immigrants—both legal
and undocumented—has only increased since that time. 78 Additionally,
as was mentioned above, the expansion of the quota did next to
nothing to address the disconnect between visa supply and demand.
Immigration reform was not the only feature of the 1990s
legislative agenda. The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) was signed into law in 1993, further intertwining the
economies of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 79 NAFTA “profoundly
altered” the demand for immigration and labor by intertwining the
economies of U.S. and Mexico. 80 The value of goods exchanged
between the U.S. and Mexico between 1985 and 2003 increased from
32.8 billion to 235.5 billion dollars. 81 At the same time, trade and the
effects of comparative advantage disrupted the structure and emphasis
of both the American and Mexican labor markets. 82 Mexico created
Id. See also Wadhia, supra note 12, at 221 (explaining that the meaning of
an “aggravated felony” was expanded, by broadening the definition of “conviction”
far beyond its traditional meaning). Even persons with expunged convictions are still
considered convicted felons under the law, and crimes which are considered
misdemeanors in some jurisdictions are considered felonies for purposes of
immigration law, following the passage of the INTC in 1994 and IIRAIRA in 1996.
See id. at 221–22.
77
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 6.
78 Id. at 7.
79 See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 451–52.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 451.
82 See id. at 452. Each country has sectors of its economy which are
comparatively weaker or stronger than its trade partners. When countries trade with
one another, it is more efficient to import goods that can be more easily be produced
abroad than at home, and vice versa. See generally Comparative Advantage,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/comparativeadvantage (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). This means that when countries trade, certain
sectors of their economy will shrink while others grow in response to the trade. This
alters the proportion of laborers working in different industries for each country
involved.
76
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more export-focused manufacturing jobs, but their number of
agricultural jobs and agricultural output fell. Agriculture shifted in
favor of the U.S. 83 Naturally, the creation of new labor markets within
the U.S. spurred immigration, and American employers were eager to
hire more workers. In the decades since the adoption of NAFTA, the
forces of globalization have only grown stronger in their influence,
disrupting more labor markets across the planet and increasing the
need for more fluid immigration and allocation of labor. 84 As the U.S.
has embraced globalization, the notion of a regulated scheme of
immigration through quotas has become an archaic relic of a more
economically insular past; its continuation is incompatible with the
country’s current ambitions and trajectory of economic development.
It is worth noting that, while the law has not yet changed,
treaties such as NAFTA are still in effect, and global trade is still
expanding, the Trump administration’s positions on trade and
immigration are consistent. The President has levied tariffs against the
major trade partners of the U.S.—including the E.U., China, Mexico,
and Canada—in spite of various trade agreements with those
countries. 85 As such, the current administration simultaneously seeks
to reduce the volume of trade and immigration together, rather than
promoting one and discouraging the other. Limitations on trade
should, in theory, reduce the influence of globalization, and thus
reduce the demand for foreign labor and the volume of immigration.
However, it is unclear whether these new trade restraints constitute
permanent changes to U.S. trade policy or whether they will affect
general trends in trade and immigration. It is possible that the
administration or its successors will reverse course on this policy, as

See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 452–53.
See id. at 448, 452–53.
85
Bob Bryan, Trump’s Trade War With China is Starting to get Nasty for U.S.
INSIDER
(Oct.
25,
2018),
Companies,
BUSINESS
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tariffs-china-trade-war-us-companiesprices-2018-10; David J. Lynch, Josh Dawsey, & Damian Paletta, Trump Imposes Steel
and Aluminum Tariffs on the E.U., Canada and Mexico, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-imposes-steel-andaluminum-tariffs-on-the-european-union-canada-andmexico/2018/05/31/891bb452-64d3-11e8-a69cb944de66d9e7_story.html?utm_term=.f10166eb73a5.
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84

204

American Immigration: A Path of Return

2019

7:1

U.S. trade partners have all retaliated. 86 Moreover, the new trade
restrictions relate to the importation of specific goods and are not
general in nature. 87 Thus, it seems unlikely that these measures will
permanently reverse the tide of globalization which drives
immigration. Further, it is unclear at this time what effect they have
had on immigration, and no data is yet available to answer this
question.
Overall, it still seems fair to say that the immigration policy of
the U.S. remains incompatible with its economic and trade policies,
since each has only recently been altered on the administrative level.
Significant governmental actions are required before it is justifiable to
say that the U.S. has permanently adopted an anti-trade, antiglobalization position. Barring broader trade restrictions, legislative
action, new treaties, and a continuation of this policy by the next
administration, long lasting state opposition to trade and globalization
seems unlikely. As such, economic trends will continue to exacerbate
the shortcomings of the quota-based immigration system.
B. The State of the Current System
The very nature of the quota system leads to gross imbalances
between the demand for visas and the number of visas granted. In
particular, the regional limitations imposed by the INA have an
outsized effect on countries with a higher demand for visa applications.
However, the per-country limits are not set with an intent to limit the
migration of people of certain ethnicities as they were in the 1920s. 88
Rather, these limits are set in the interest of fairness, so that the
demand for visas in any particular region does not eclipse or exclude
visa applicants from other regions. 89 To the contrary, INA Section
202(a) emphasizes that race and national origin are not grounds for
discrimination. 90 In fact, the provision explicitly bars the issuance of
immigrant visas, and the setting of preferences and priorities, based on
a “person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of
86
87
88
89
90

See id.
Id.
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 3–4.
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
Id.
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residence.” 91 The regional limitations now in place are merely the
logical consequence of trying to make a quota system “fair.” Where
there is a cap on the total number of persons admitted, distinctions
will have to be drawn to ensure no single group is favored to the
exclusion of the rest.
When viewed in terms of proportion, this policy is far less just
in practice than in principle, because the places with the greatest need
are subject to the greatest limitation. As of November 2016, there were
4,259,573 applications for visas under the four family preference
categories, not including the millions more who were exempted from
the quota as “immediate family members.” 92 Within the family
preference categories, Mexico has 1,308,000 visa applicants patiently
waiting for admittance, while the remaining top ten nations with the
most applicants only had between 300,000 and 100,000 applicants. 93
Despite the excessively high demand within the family preference
category, there was a 15,820 visa limit per-country, including Mexico. 94
At the same time, there were also 107,479 applications for visas filed
under the employment-based visa categories. 95 India, mainland China,
and the Philippines collectively accounted for the overwhelming
majority of employment-based applications, numbering 98,948 in
total. 96 However, each of these countries was only allotted 9,800
employment visas in accordance with INA Section 202. 97 Since the
countries with the highest demand for visas are allotted so few, the
applicants from those countries must wait a very long time for
admittance. By contrast, applicants from countries with less demand
will face shorter wait times.
The current backlog of applications is also immense and
intractable. Immigrant visa applications are filed all around the globe
Id.
NAT’L VISA CTR., ANNUAL REPORT OF IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS IN
THE FAMILY-SPONSORED AND EMPLOYMENT-BASED PREFERENCES REGISTERED
AT THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2016 12(2016).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 15.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 14.
91
92
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but can only be satisfied when there are visas available for issue. Since
this can take a considerable amount of time, lines form and a backlog
of applications builds up. It can take up to two decades before an
applicant’s priority date becomes current, allowing them to apply for
permanent resident status. 98 Prior to that, they file a petition, which is
then processed, and while processing itself is rather sluggish, one’s
priority date only becomes current when there are visas available for
the applicant’s particular preference category and country of origin. 99
Thus, the wait times for Mexican, Chinese, Indian, and Filipino
applicants are usually extremely long. 100 For example, in 2013, Filipino
siblings of U.S. citizens faced wait times of roughly twenty-three years
while those of Mexican origin faced wait times of up to sixteen years. 101
By contrast, siblings of U.S. citizens from nations with substantially
fewer applications faced wait times of up to thirteen years. 102 While
wait times for most visa applications are long, the seven-percent cap
imposed on nations with higher volumes of applications makes wait
times for those countries extreme. At the very least, the length of time
applications wait to become current indicates that present visa
allotments are grossly out of step with the demand for visas. 103 It is
also fairly clear that the law does not adequately take into account the
inequities that result from demand varying from place to place, despite
the stated goals of INA Section 202(a). 104 All in all, the Migration Policy
Institute estimates that it could take up to nineteen years to completely
clear the backlog. 105
The preference category a green card applicant selects can also
have a drastic impact on his or her wait time. It may be that an
applicant is eligible for multiple visa categories, but that filing for one
type of visa over another could mean a wait difference of a few decades
or more. For example, in India, applicants filing for an EB-1 visa, for
persons of “extraordinary ability,” face a projected wait time of only
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Bergeron, supra note 35, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 3–4.
See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
Bergeron, supra note 35, at 8.
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six years for their visas to become current. 106 Whereas, people filing
EB-3 applications for persons with bachelor’s degrees face wait times
of up to seventeen years. 107 EB-2 applicants from India, or those with
advanced degrees, face an incredible projected wait time of one-hundred
and fifty years, effectively barring their admittance. 108 This means that
the choice of filing for one’s application is a highly strategic decision.
However, when the shortest wait times belong to the most exclusive
categories, and when those times are also many years long, immigration
to the U.S. from certain countries may not be an option at all. This
results in the same kind of region by region discrimination that the
INA was supposed to undo.
Of course, there are more consequences to centrally managed
immigration and arbitrary allocation of visas than long wait times. The
closed nature of the system comes at a high economic cost, creating
black market labor, encouraging worker exploitation, and forcing
taxpayers to fund the Sisyphean project of restricting the natural
movement of people at the borders. 109 This is especially true with
regard to Mexican immigration. 110 As economic forces continue to
encourage Mexican workers to enter the American labor market,
restrictive granting of both temporary and permanent work visas
contributes to increased undocumented traffic into the country. 111 This
makes border enforcement more difficult and more expensive, because
incentives created by the law encourage the violation of the law.
Meanwhile, stricter border enforcement and stiffer penalties for
entering the country without authorization discourage the temporary
migration of seasonal agricultural workers. Threatened with
detainment and permanent bars to future reentry into the U.S., it often
seems wiser to simply remain in the U.S. than to attempt to return to
Mexico. Such an attempt would raise the risk of capture and economic
exile from the country due to enhanced border security. Ironically, the
draconian enforcement of laws designed to restrict immigration and
Bier, supra note 5.
Id.
108 Id.
109 See generally Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 445
passim (detailing the failures of U.S. immigration policy with regard to Mexico).
110 Id.
111
Garcia, supra note 38, at 1052–53.
106
107
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unlawful presence converts would-be economic migrants into
permanent settlers by reducing migrants’ incentives to return to their
countries of origin.
Worse still, when migrants and immigrants are undocumented
they become at risk for blackmail, coercion, and worker exploitation. 112
Due to the fact that they are in the country without valid
documentation and often exist outside the system, undocumented
immigrants and migrants operate without the protection of U.S.
federal and state labor laws. 113 This is especially true of unskilled
workers. 114 Moreover, the threat of detainment and deportation can be
used as a weapon by employers—as well as others—to exploit
undocumented persons who stand to lose their entire livelihoods. 115 In
combination, this means that people drawn to the U.S. by promises of
economic opportunity may become trapped in inhospitable working
conditions for little pay because they have the prospect of deportation
hanging over their heads.
Curiously, black market labor conditions also provide
undocumented persons a competitive edge over domestic workers. 116
Since undocumented workers can work for less than minimum wage,
and since their labor conditions are not subject to regulation, this
makes them less costly and therefore more desirable than domestic
workers and documented immigrants. 117 Thus, it stands to reason that
a more liberal immigration policy, and the uninhibited issuance of
visas, would equalize competition between domestic and foreign
workers. Domestic and documented workers would not be undercut
to the same degree by undocumented workers, because fewer workers
would be undocumented. Additionally, fewer undocumented
See id. at 1062–63.
See id.
114 See id. at 1061–63.
115 See id.
116 See CHRISTOPH ALBERT, UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA, THE LABOR
MARKET IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: JOB CREATION VS. JOB
COMPETITION
3
(2017),
https://www.upf.edu/documents/2963149/3253728/The_Labor_Market_Impact
_of_Undocumented_Immigrants_Christoph_Albert_April2017.pdf.
117 See id.
112
113
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workers—either immigrants or temporary laborers—would be subject
to exploitation because of their status.
C. Attempts at Reform
Over the years there have been many proposed reforms
offered to fix the American immigration system. Conventionally
defined, “comprehensive proposals” usually attempt to address most
of the problems with immigration at once. Functionally, these
proposals try to address five key aspects of immigration policy and
their associated problems. 118 First, they offer provisions for
accommodating the undocumented immigrants currently residing in
the country. 119 Second, they attempt to account for the future flow of
immigrants and the changes in demand for visas. 120 Third, they attempt
to reduce processing and wait times that currently plague the system. 121
Fourth, they place emphasis on creating more targeted immigration,
border, and customs enforcement. 122 Finally, they attempt to mitigate
any domestic economic hardship that may result from further
immigration. 123 However, the various proposals go about this in
different ways and with different points of emphasis.
Many—if not most—reform proposals focus on heightened
border security, amnesty, and the elimination of red tape. Yet, these
proposals do not radically alter the current system or its architecture.
Instead, they simply intend to streamline it. New provisions mandate
electronic documentation, more precise filing dates, and an increase in
funding for border security. 124 In terms of satisfying the goals of
comprehensive reform, the recommended measures do address the
key goals but fail to treat the underlying problem, which is the attempt
to manage the flow of immigration in the first place. The
misperception that immigration regulation is a function of sovereignty
Wadhia, supra note 12, at 207.
Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See generally Alrashid, supra note 12 (wherein, the article discusses several
proposals that center around these three things).
118
119
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has not been shed by many of these authors. 125 Truly comprehensive
reforms would require the abolition of the quota system, the creation
of an efficient system of application processing, and a change in
attitude, which would leave behind more modern notions of
“sovereignty.” However, from a practical perspective, it makes sense
that, despite their comprehensive scope, most proposed reforms
attempt merely to modify the existing structure of the law; that task is
comparatively easy. Unfortunately, many proposals also
overemphasize security or make use of negative reinforcement to
manage immigration flows and labor demands.
Congress recently attempted to pass immigration reform, in
response to the Trump administration’s recision of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). 126 However, as of
publication of this comment, this reform bill has not been passed. 127
S.1615, or the Dream Act of 2017, would have enshrined DACA in
law, whereas DACA previously existed merely as a form of
prosecutorial discretion prescribed by the Obama administration. 128
Thus, the bill would cancel the removal of “dreamers,” now of-age
persons who unlawfully entered the U.S. as children, so long as they
were not considered inadmissible for some other reason detailed in the
INA. It would also create a pathway for dreamers to become Lawful
Permanent Residents. However, like DACA, the Dream Act is not
comprehensive. The only persons eligible for its protection are those
who were present for four years before the bill’s passage. 129 Those who
entered the country after that time could not claim its benefits: namely,
stays of removal and a pathway to Lawful Permanent Resident
status. 130 Unfortunately, this means that the Dream Act offers only a
temporary fix available to a select group of people. The problem the
bill attempts to address will persist for similarly situated people who

Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 447.
S. 1615, 115th Cong. (2017).
127
Jesse Byrnes, Pelosi Insists on ‘Clean’ DREAM Act Amid Trump Furor, THE
HILL (Jan. 12, 2018, 10:05 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/368856pelosi-insists-on-clean-dream-act-amid-trump-furor.
128
S. 1615.
129 Id. § 3(b)(1)(A).
130 See id. § 3.
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have entered after that time and for justly aggrieved people in different
circumstances not comprehended by DACA.
DACA and the Dream Act are thought to be necessary because
it seems fundamentally unjust to enact removal proceedings against
people who have lived the majority of their lives in the U.S. Culturally,
many dreamers are American and have little or no meaningful ties to
their country of birth. 131 They are trapped by circumstance because as
children they entered or remained in the country unlawfully as
dependents of their parents. 132
However, the circumstances which lead to the necessity of
DACA and the Dream Act are created by the INA itself. As previously
discussed, the wait times for immigrant visas are extremely long and
even longer for countries which exceed the seven-percent limit placed
on visa issuance. 133 “Illegal” immigration is thus incentivized, and black
markets for immigration are formed in response. 134 By consequence,
the arbitrary nature of the law is brought into full view; people who
have lived in the U.S. for virtually their entire lives are treated as
unamerican by the law and live under constant threat of removal. This
is why many proposals include an amnesty provision; it is impractical
and unjust to remove large numbers of productive and peaceful people
who established roots inside the country.
Prior comprehensive reforms, such as IRCA in 1986,
contained amnesty provisions but also covered other areas of the
law. 135 IRCA was described as a “three-legged stool” which granted
amnesty to persons already residing illegally in the U.S. but also
enhanced border security and created penalties for hiring

See AUDREY SINGER & NICOLE PRCHAL SVAJLENKA, BROOKINGS
METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION FACTS: DEFERRED ACTION FOR
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) 9 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/DACA_singer_svajlenka_FINAL.pdf.
132 See id.
133
Bergeron, supra note 35, at 4.
134
Wadhia, supra note 12, at 206.
135 See MUZAFFAR CHISTI & CHARLES KAMASAKI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
IRCA IN RETROSPECT: GUIDEPOSTS FOR TODAY’S IMMIGRATION REFORM 1–2
(2014).
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undocumented immigrants. 136 In doing so, IRCA attempted to
discourage further unlawful immigration. 137 Current political
discussions surrounding the Dream Act also indicate that its passage
will require the inclusion of more border security provisions and
possibly the construction of a border wall. 138 Indeed, even the more
positive aspects of the bill, such as pathways to citizenship, have been
considerably weakened throughout the course of negotiation. 139 Since
these reforms build off of the current structure of the law, they often
draw from a sort of carrot-and-stick approach. They grant amnesty but
couple it with punishments and enhanced security for the future.
The incentives for illegal immigration to the U.S. are strong
because, despite the INA’s emphasis on family-based immigration,
employment is also a large driver of immigration. 140 By consequence,
there is a large backlog of work visa applications, which encourages
understandably frustrated applicants to bypass the system. 141 Thus, to
solve the problem, many proposals increase the quota limit for work
visas or reallocate a greater share of the existing visa supply to the
worker categories. For example, the Secure America Act of 2005 would
have allocated 400,000 visas to a new “H-5” worker visa category. 142
The exact supply of these H-5 visas would have been allowed to
increase or decrease somewhat based on demand. 143 Another bill,
proposed at the same time as the Secure America Act, would have
expanded the availability of temporary worker visas under a newly
invented “W” category. 144 The former bill was advertised as “marketbased” when it was proposed, because it focused on worker categories
and attempted to expand quotas to better accommodate the demand
Id. at 1.
See id.
138
Ali Vitali, Trump: Give me the wall, I’ll give you ‘Dreamers’, NBC NEWS (Jan.
4, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trumpborder-wall-must-be-part-any-daca-deal-n834671.
139
Tara Golshan, Congress Failed to do Something on Immigration — again. Here’s
Why., VOX (July 2, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/7/2/17509726/congress-fail-immigration-again.
140 See generally WEST, supra note 13.
141 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 205–06.
142 Id. at 208.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 209–10.
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for visas. 145 However, it is misleading to describe the bill as marketbased because it still placed a fixed number on the amount of visas that
could be issued. A truly market-centered approach would not set a cap
on the issuance of any particular kind of visa to the exclusion of others,
based on the perceived needs of policymakers, because markets
allocate resources unconsciously. 146 Moreover, a truly market-oriented
approach would not set an artificial cap on the supply of available visas.
Markets are not and cannot be guided by means of central
administration. 147
Another major push for comprehensive reform was made in
2007. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, or
“Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform
Act of 2007,” like previous bills, would have created a new visa
category. 148 This one would have created transitional “Y” and “Z”
visas, which were designed specifically to adjust to permanent resident
status. 149 This would have allowed more people to wait inside the U.S.,
rather than in their countries of origin, so that the visa wait times would
not overly disrupt the lives of prospective immigrants. It failed to
pass. 150 While this solution would not have eliminated or curbed wait
times caused by visa quotas, it might have made their effects less
pernicious. However, the bill also included more nativist provisions,
such as one that made English the national language and another which
restricted familial migration to immediate relatives only. 151 This latter
provision was designed to end chain migration. 152

See id. at 208; Id. n.33.
See Hayek, supra note 64, at 519–20 passim.
147 See id.
148
Alrashid, supra note 12, at 30–33.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 33–34.
152 Id. Chain migration is the logical result of a visa system that creates
preferences based on familial proximity. However, it is also a pattern of immigration
that has occurred in the U.S. for its entire history. Person A immigrates to the
country, qualifying person B for a visa because they are a relative of A. Person B’s
status then qualifies person C—a relative of B—for a visa, C qualifies D, and so on.
There is nothing wrong with chain migration, but its potentially exponential effects
are often exaggerated by those who wish to stigmatize immigrants. In reality, the visa
145
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While most proposals attempt in some way to alleviate the
disparity in supply and demand for visas, they also seek to enhance
administrative efficiency in the enforcement of the law. Despite adding
provisions which contribute to the INA’s complexity—such as new
visa categories and nuanced eligibility requirements for each of them—
reformers seek to cut through red tape by consolidating federal
databases to make the application process more streamlined. 153 These
same efficiency measures are also intended to augment enforcement
of immigration laws. 154 Many, including the reform acts of 2007,
introduce digital registries which make things like proof of
employment or visa currency more efficient and accessible. 155 This has
potential to speed up the application process for preference categories
that require proof of employment. 156 The is what the e-verify program
does. 157
The digitizing of information is intended to consolidate the
knowledge of various federal and state agencies and thereby enhance
efficiency. 158 In particular, the data gathered from the Employment
Eligibility Verification System would be used to identify employers
engaged in the unlawful hiring of immigrants who are not eligible to
work in the U.S. This would be achieved through a careful monitoring
of social security numbers. 159 Although it makes perfect sense to
digitize the system for the sake of efficiency, doing so is a double-edged
sword. More effective enforcement of the immigration law means that
the law will increasingly conflict with the demands of the labor market.
backlog means that, at present, the progression from person A to C could take
decades to resolve; a move from A to D could take close to a century. “Chain
migration” has, for this reason, become a loaded and often misleading term. Contra
JESSICA VAUGHAN, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD., IMMIGRATION MULTIPLIERS: TRENDS IN
CHAIN MIGRATION 1 (2017), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/vaughanchain-migration_0.pdf, (in which the author describes the process of chain migration,
and suggests ways of curbing it).
153
Alrashid, supra note 12, at 35–37 (discussing employment eligibility
verification).
154 See id. at 35–37.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 36.
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As globalization continues to exert its influence, the country is
projected to become increasingly reliant on foreign-born workers. 160
Constricting the flow of labor, and doing so more effectively, appears
counterproductive.
Despite laudable goals of increasing visa access and enhancing
administrative efficiency, reformers often include measures which
reemphasize U.S. sovereignty and security. The assertion of
sovereignty is often expressed through measures which enhance
border security and enforcement, even when doing so is highly
problematic. For example, the Employment Eligibility Verification
System would rely on the REAL ID Act for enforcement. 161 That act
enabled immigration judges to deny relief to immigrants merely
because they lack written proof of hardship. 162 It also restricts habeas
corpus rights in places where the INA bars judicial review. 163 This can
lead to undue hardship and lack of due process for certain kinds of
immigrants, and refugees in particular. 164
Border security is also emphasized to an often irrational extent.
However, this may be because it is a politically popular measure. Given
that the majority of persons unlawfully present in the U.S. entered with
inspection, and thus did not illegally cross the border, border
enforcement certainly seems overemphasized. 165 It is evident that this
is motivated by notions of sovereignty, even in the naming of the bills.
For example, the names of the Secure America Act and the Secure
Borders Act, covered above, clearly assert the authors’ intents to
solidify American borders and thus assert the sovereignty of the
country. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 would
have added 20,000 more full-time U.S. Border Patrol agents to the
Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 451.
Alrashid, supra note 12, at 35.
162 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 237–38
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 See Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a
Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half
Million, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 124, 127 (2017) (providing statistics for
2014 indicating that two-thirds of all unauthorized immigrants are visa overstays and
not EWIs.)
160
161
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BPA, along with 370 miles of fencing along the U.S.–Mexico border. 166
The Trump administration has also echoed calls for expansion of the
border patrol. 167 In particular, President Trump requested 15,000 more
agents for the Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), despite its possible deleterious effects on agency
competency. 168 Increases to border fencing were also called for in the
CLEAR Act, which would have enabled state police officers to enforce
immigration laws in a manner similar to ICE, and converted the civil
offense of unlawful presence into a criminal offense. 169
Overall, most proposed reforms are mixed bags. In reality, they
are inadequate suggestions that also include some rather harmful
provisions. In general, all of the proposals detailed above suffer from
two major flaws. First, and most importantly, they fail to change the
fundamental mechanism of visa allocation provided by the INA.
Second, by placing an emphasis on security and enforcement of the
existing law, they exacerbate the inefficiencies and black-market
incentives created by the quota system. The best remedy detailed
above, transitional visas—designed to alleviate the pain of waiting for
permanent visas—is only a half measure. 170 Other suggestions, like
new visa categories and an increase of 400,000 available visas, are also
only temporary solutions to the imbalance of visa demand and
supply. 171 In time, demand may again come to exceed the supply; thus,
such measures are, at the very least, not stable solutions.
Crackdowns on immigration enforcement exacerbate the pains
caused by the inefficiencies inherent in the allotment of visas. The long
wait times created by the lack of visa supply is in part alleviated by
unlawful migration. Lax enforcement of immigration laws provides
people who could otherwise not afford to wait in a twenty-year long
Alrashid, supra note 12, at 30–31.
Brian Naylor, Trump’s Plan to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol and ICE Agents
Won’t
Be
Easy,
NPR
(Feb.,
23,
2017,
5:12
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516712980/trumps-plan-to-hire-15-000border-patrol-and-ice-agents-wont-be-easy-to-fulfill.
168 Id.
169 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 212.
170 See Alrashid, supra note 12, at 35–38.
171 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 208.
166
167
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line the ability to live their lives in the U.S., even though they might
place themselves at risk for removal. 172 While this does open up
unfortunate possibilities of worker exploitation, such issues would be
better attended to by vigorous enforcement of employment law and
worker’s rights rather than immigration law. 173 While one might argue
that overstaying one’s visa or entering without a visa is unfair to those
who have patiently waited, one cannot know what exigencies,
challenges, or pressing concerns any particular individual faces. Yet, in
most cases, immigrants, documented and undocumented, have lived
peacefully in the U.S. for more than a decade. 174 Crackdowns on
enforcement may incentivize overstays, for fear that one may not be
able to reenter the country after making a small mistake. Aside from
this risk, crackdowns on immigration enforcement and stricter border
security may simply make the lives of good people needlessly difficult.
In general, the efforts expended during enforcement are
asymmetrically disproportionate to the risks of lax enforcement.
IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND A PATH FORWARD
A. Proposed Policy Changes
An open and generous immigration policy would best meet the
five general goals of comprehensive immigration reform, because it
would alleviate the systemic imbalances created by the present
incarnation of the INA. First, a general amnesty provision could
accommodate people who are already here unlawfully. Second, visas
issued without quota limits, with simple eligibility requirements, could
eliminate the current backlog of applications. The backlog exists
because more people apply for visas every year than there are visas
Consider that those seeking employment in the United States must often
demonstrate that they have a job before their visa is approved. The wait time
involved in getting that visa may cause opportunity to pass them and their employers
by. Likewise, people may be separated from spouses, siblings, parents, and other
close family members for undue amounts of time. In many cases, this may be enough
incentive to stay past the time allotted by one’s temporary visa. Administrative
difficulties inherent to the system may also be too difficult to navigate effectively,
making mistakes and overstays more likely.
173 Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 446.
174 See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 9, at 5–6.
172

218

2019

American Immigration: A Path of Return

7:1

available. 175 If there were no quota and visas were issued according to
market demand, then there would be no delay other than processing.
There would be little issue accommodating the future flow of
immigrants because such a system would not attempt to manage it.
Visas would simply be issued as qualifying people apply. Third, without
complex visa preference categories, processing times could be reduced.
General immigrant visas could simply require that the applicant meet
basic health standards and satisfy criminal background checks. The
visa applicant would no-longer have to navigate complex employment
requirements or prove that they are of some specific familial relation
to a sponsor. No visa sponsors would be required. In this context,
digitization of the process could also help streamline applications.
Finally, because incentives for black-market labor and immigration
would be reduced by the unlimited availability of legitimate visas,
enforcement of current border and customs law would become less
burdensome. Fewer people would be in violation of the law because
they would have access to legitimate alternatives. How this might
impact domestic laborers is another question.
A general amnesty provision is necessary for comprehensive
reform. People who are already peacefully residing in the country
deserve to stay. However, the amnesty provision must be as sweeping
as possible. It must also be accompanied by another provision that
renders future grants of amnesty unnecessary, as amnesty is always a
temporary solution. Thus, the provision of the INA which penalizes
unlawful presence must also be amended. 176 When a non-citizen has
not committed an actual crime, it should always be possible for the
non-citizen to re-enter the country or adjust oneself to legal status.
Waivers for hardship must not be the only exceptions to the rule. 177
Rather, bars to re-entry themselves should be the exception. They
should be reserved solely for non-citizens who have committed serious
175 See Bergeron, supra note 4, at 4 (indicating that the most extreme wait
times are in excess of twenty years in countries that have exceeded the 7% global visa
cap, and thus are treated to special restrictions on visa issuance).
176
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B). This section of the INA provides for a three
and ten-year bar to re-entry after accruing unlawful presence in the U.S. Id. at §
1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Since admissibility is a requirement for visa eligibility, this presents
a major obstacle for non-citizens not covered by the amnesty provision.
177
8 U.S.C. § 1182(B)-(C).
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crimes or pose dangers to the public health. In general, the only limit
on re-entry into the U.S. should be the time it takes to process a valid
visa, whether temporary or permanent.
Amnesty provisions necessarily have certain drawbacks. Aside
from being temporary fixes which do not help contend with future
undocumented populations, they also seem to do some harm to the
rule of law. People who are residing in the U.S. unlawfully, after all, are
here unlawfully. To forgive their transgressions en masse is to
undermine the legitimacy of law itself. “Amnesty,” because of this
notion, has become somewhat of a dirty word. 178 However, the rule of
law is threatened more by the conditions created by the current
immigration system and the INA than it would be by a temporary
measure designed to alleviate those conditions. A law that encourages
its own violation does harm to the rule of law. Black market labor,
border evasion, entry without inspection, and unlawful presence itself,
are all, in part, the result of too few available visas. While the unlimited
issuance of visas, regulated merely by demand, would solve these
problems, it could not assist the millions of people who are already
ineligible for visas due to the accrual of unlawful presence. Therefore,
an amnesty provision would be needed.
The most necessary element of truly comprehensive reform is
the complete elimination of all visa quotas. This requires the repeal of
INA § 203 and the seven-percent per-country allocation limit of INA
§ 202. There should be no ceiling for the issuance of visas. They should
be issued on an unlimited basis, whenever a qualified applicant applies.
While some might object that unlimited visas would allow an
unmanageable number of immigrants into the U.S., this is not the case.
Immigration flows are mostly self-regulating. Although visas are
theoretically unlimited, rates of immigration tend to vary alongside the

David Frum, Five Reasons Obama Shouldn’t Declare Amnesty, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/fivereasons-obama-shouldnt-declare-amnesty-immigration-executive-order/382845/;
Mark Krikorian, Just Don’t Call it ‘Chain Migration’!, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Dec. 21,
2017), https://cis.org/Oped/Just-Dont-Call-It-Chain-Migration.
178
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unemployment rate and economic conditions in general. 179 Low
unemployment rates tend to coincide with high rates of immigration. 180
Whereas, when the unemployment rate is high, rates of immigration
are reduced. 181 Thus, we will never be overwhelmed by immigrants.
They come when there is room for them, and when they can find
opportunity. Pull factors are relative to the present condition of our
country, and so people generally come only when the conditions are
comparatively favorable to those of their own. For example, the recent,
net-negative rate of immigration coincided with the 2008 financial
crisis. 182 Similar drops in immigration occurred during the Great
Depression. 183 If anything, rates of immigration are a vital sign that
indicates the health of the country. High rates of immigration indicate
good health.
Some might fear the consequences of quota-less immigration.
Two principal concerns are that the high demand for visas might
overburden the state’s administrative apparatus and that a flood of
foreign workers might depress domestic wages and working
conditions. These fears are misguided. Initially, the current backlog
might create a temporary flood of applications which the current
bureaucratic infrastructure could not accommodate. However, there is
little reason to imagine that this problem would remain an issue
forever. The backlog is a side effect of the quotas which suppressed
the supply of visas. In time, that would subside and give way to more
regular requests for visas. At the moment, there is a mass of people
waiting in line. But without a quota, a buildup of visa applications is
less likely because they will be granted as needed. The current of
applications will become steady, even if the initial rush is like a tidal
wave. To mitigate the impact of the initial rush, it may also be necessary
to bolster the resources available to consulates and federal agencies

179
David Bier, Why Unemployment is Lower When Immigration is Higher, CATO
INST. (July 26, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/why-unemploymentlower-when-immigration-higher.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 9; Bier, supra note 179.
183
Bier, supra note 179, at fig. 1.
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charged with processing applications. To that end, it is advisable to
increase funding to relevant agencies prior to enacting this proposal.
The second concern is more complicated. However, a more
liberal immigration policy would reduce the frequency of unfair
competition between foreign and domestic workers. People who are
U.S. citizens or documented workers are subject to labor laws,
minimum wage laws, and entitled to certain benefits. All of this makes
them far costlier to hire than people who can be paid at any wage and
who are not entitled to any sort of protection. However, by making it
easy to acquire documentation and enter the system, the incentive to
work at depressed wages is reduced. This is particularly true when
documentation offers the promise of higher wages and hospitable
working conditions, as mandated by law. Moreover, because rates of
immigration rise alongside economic growth and strong employment
numbers, there is little reason to suppose that immigration will depress
wages or harm domestic rates of employment. 184
Optimally, all worker and familial preference categories should
be done away with, alongside the quotas themselves. With a limitless
supply of visas available for eligible persons, it would seem useless to
draw distinctions between types of applicants. However, policymakers
may still wish to retain visa categories in order to protect domestic
laborers. If that is the case, no numerical limits need to be set, but visas
could still be issued based on whether an applicant satisfies the
requirements of any given category. If an applicant could not prove
that they would not threaten domestic employment, the visa could still
be denied, absent a quota. The backlog would still be relatively minimal
because there would be no “line” for pending application currency.
Whenever an applicant satisfied the conditions of admission, they
could be admitted. In either case, the abolition of quotas would vastly
improve the present situation and problems with the law.
However, preference categories ought to be abolished.
Without quotas, the preference categories seem superfluous. If an
applicant fails to meet the qualifications of one visa category, they
See Albert, supra note 116, at 2–4 (arguing that the job creation effect of
immigration dominates and outweighs the negative effects of immigration on wages,
resulting in an increase in the net wealth of society).
184
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could simply apply for another. As there is no limit to the number of
visas available, visa types would not be much of an obstacle. The
choice of application one files is already strategic, as mentioned above.
People choose whichever preference category affords them the best
chance of timely admission. Moreover, as they are arbitrary distinctions
which do not objectively assess the potential benefits of individual
immigrant’s admissions, or the national interest, preference categories
should be gotten rid of. Absent quotas, preference categories provide
no tangible benefit to the public interest.
Finally, this proposal would not require any serious change to
customs and border enforcement law. The reduction of wait times
would inherently make the law more enforceable, because there would
be less incentive to violate the law. Assuming that adequate
background checks and security at points of entry are carried out, there
should be little security risk from greater volumes of legal immigrants
entering the country. National security and public health interests can
still be protected. There is no reason not to screen visa applicants.
There just might be more of them to screen. While this may increase
processing time for applications, the primary cause of the backlog—a
limited supply of visas—will still be addressed. Therefore, the
incentives to follow the law will not be meaningfully diminished
because wait times will not be egregious, or decades long. Overall, it is
easier to address national security and public health concerns when it
is known who is in the country and when they have been vetted. To
accomplish this, people must be encouraged to enter the country
legally and to submit to inspection. Thus, an open and liberal
immigration policy would further protect U.S. security and public
health interests.
B. Historical Analogues & Shifts in Attitudes
Although the Chinese Exclusion laws were passed in the 1870s,
they did not reflect the general character or framework of the law.
Rather, they were an explicit exception to the law. Immigration into
the country was unrestricted. 185 Visas were also not a requirement until
While the topic of naturalization is somewhat outside of the scope of this
comment, one should also note that from 1790 until the early 1900s, the only
immigrants capable of naturalizing were of European descent. See generally
185
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after World War I. Prior to this period, migration between the U.S. and
other nations was fairly open and free-flowing.
While for most of the nation’s history borders were
unrestricted and migration and immigration were unregulated, this
might have been, to some degree, a matter of practicality rather than
desire. Technological or financial issues could have rendered strong
border enforcement impossible. Yet, it is highly doubtful that anyone
could have said that condition diminished the nation’s sovereignty.
The U.S. thrived in this period, in part because immigrant labor helped
fuel the industrial revolution and westward expansion. The United
States’ power as a nation-state was visibly augmented. By World War
I, the U.S. was a prominent player on the world stage. What processing
did occur was often done at ports and other common points of entry;
control of infectious disease was the primary concern. 186 It is also
worth noting that even after this era had ended and the National
Origins Quota System had gone into effect, the country’s immediate
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, were exempted from the law. 187
Enforcement of strong physical borders was not a priority.
The modern notion of strong borders and the regulation of
immigration arose in part because of Chinese Exclusion. The inevitable
legal battles that resulted from the passage of the Chinese Exclusion
Act helped establish the plenary powers doctrine. 188 This doctrine
afforded the government virtually unlimited power to regulate
immigration as a natural extension of its sovereignty and established
that non-citizens have little or no constitutional protections. 189 If we
OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2. Although this comment uses
America’s early history to provide an example of how and why unrestricted
immigration works, one should not think that all aspects of this period’s immigration
policy were ideal, or that that is in any way what this comment suggests.
186
Howard Markel & Alexandra Minna Stern, Which Face? Whose Nation?
Immigration, Public Health, and the Construction of Disease at America’s Ports and Borders,
1891–1928, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, 1314, 1315 (1999). Markel and Stern also
argue that concern about infectious disease and other health concerns was also highly
racially charged and pretext for discrimination. See id. at 1315–16.
187 See OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2, at 1–5.
188 See Ting, supra note 21, at 304–06 (discussing the role of Chinese
Exclusion adjudication in the creation of the plenary power).
189 Id.
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can rediscover older notions of sovereignty, it may be easier to
convince people that an open border state would not injure the country
or the rule of law.
The Supreme Court recently ruled on a case that promised to
reconsider the scope of the plenary power. It was hoped by some,
including this author, that a negative ruling on the Trump
administration’s travel ban would narrow the reach of the plenary
power, or perhaps even spell its doom. 190 This would, in turn, create
room for a national reconsideration of the relationship between border
security and sovereignty. Modern notions of sovereignty were born as
a justification for the Chinese Exclusion Act and expressed as the
plenary powers doctrine. If that doctrine were undermined, it is
possible that a shift in law could influence a subsequent shift in the
public conception of sovereignty. That would make a meaningful
change in policy all the more probable.
Instead, the Court implicitly endorsed the plenary power, the
power of Congress to manage immigration with great judicial
deference, and confirmed that Congress could delegate that power to
the President. 191 Moreover, the Court also expanded the scope of the
power as applied to the President. 192 They expanded the modern
expression of the plenary power, articulated in Fiallo v. Bell, saying,
“[f]or more than a century, this Court has recognized that the
admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.’” 193 Ultimately, the
Court upheld the travel ban, applying nothing more than rational basis
review. 194 Thus, while hope that the Court and the nation might
reconsider the plenary powers doctrine and its relationship to U.S.
sovereignty is not lost, it has been greatly diminished.

190
Jill E. Family, Trump’s Travel Ban and the Limits of the U.S. Constitution,
WIDENER U. COMMONWEALTH L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 17–
10. 1–2 (2017).
191 See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
192 See id. at 2412–15.
193 Id. at 2418 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
194 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–23 (evaluating legitimate state interests).

225

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2019

7:1

In many ways, the law as it existed before the National Origins
Quota Act, or even the Chinese Exclusion Act, serves as an excellent
model for a comprehensive reform proposal going forward. History
illustrates that rather than harming U.S. workers, the nation was better
off as a result of immigration. The modern experience illustrates this
as well. 195 Given that the modern economy is increasingly intertwined
with that of Mexico and Canada, the reduction of any barriers between
all three countries also seems logical; a reversion to this state of affairs
would be a positive change. Processing and approval for entry at ports
and airports should remain for security and health reasons, but the
larger bureaucratic framework could be markedly reduced. Specific
enforcement of land borders could also be largely abandoned. With
the law enforcement emphasis cast aside, a more market-oriented
system of free migration could replace the antiquated quota model.
The government would still retain the power to deport criminals, as it
has since its inception. However, a system of free migration and
immigration would virtually eliminate wait times and sharply reduce
the amount of bureaucratic red tape. Sadly, much must change,
culturally and legally, before such reform is possible.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite various reforms and reform proposals, the core policy
instituted by the INA is archaic, and cannot be remedied. The quotas
and preference categories that characterize the system are inherently
arbitrary and remain in conflict with U.S. economic interests and the
basic laws of supply and demand. 196 The consequences have been long
wait times, miles of red tape, and people deprived of opportunities to
work or live with their families. 197 By examining history and shifting
the emphasis away from sovereignty and back to economic expansion,
it is possible to correct these wrongs, although this shift is unlikely to
occur. The INA quota system ought to be abandoned in favor of a
system of free migration and immigration.

195
196
197

tape).

See Bier, supra note 179.
See Globalization, Security & Human Rights, supra note 7, at 449.
See Bergeron, supra note 4, at 1–7 (detailing wait times and logistical red
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A system of free migration and immigration, rooted in the
actual demand for visas, could eliminate the unjust backlog created by
the quota system. It would also conceivably reduce the burdens of
enforcing immigration and customs law. The processing of visas would
go more smoothly because there would be less required to file an
application. One would simply need to satisfy basic requirements
relating to health and public safety. Rather than creating a lawless
atmosphere, it would simply make the law more realistic, manageable,
and reflective of people’s needs. There is also little need to reduce the
strength of the U.S. security apparatus. As more people apply for legal
status within the U.S., less energy will be required to police the activity
of those who do not. However, such a proposal will face significant
opposition, and its enactment is, sadly, unlikely.
At present, the U.S. has a strong tradition of sovereignty, but
popular notions of what that entails are newer than is commonly
understood. 198 This tradition is unlikely to change, as suggested by the
most recent Supreme Court precedent on the subject. 199 Maintaining
porous borders and allowing theoretically limitless migration and
immigration from all corners of the Earth seemingly threatens this
tradition. However, the threat is misbegotten. Sovereignty comes from
a nation’s ability to enforce its own laws, not the solidity of its borders.
Further, migration and immigration are not limitless; they are regulated
by supply and demand. Demand is not always high. During times of
economic strife in the U.S., or prosperity elsewhere, rates of
immigration and migration into the U.S. are reduced. 200 The
unemployment rate is actually lower when the rate of immigration is
higher, and vice-versa. 201 In order for a system of free migration to
become politically feasible, myths of what sovereignty is and is not
must be broken. In order to do this, it is necessary for the public to
acquire greater knowledge of the United States’ immigration history.
198 See Ting, supra note 21, at 303–07 (explaining that these notions arise out
of Supreme Court cases contrived to justify the Chinese Exclusion Act and
establishing the plenary power).
199 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–19 (upholding the principle that the
executive and legislative branches wield extensive power over “the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals. . . .”).
200 See Wadhia, supra note 12, at 204.
201
Bier, supra note 179.
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In particular, Americans must understand that the management of
immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon. 202 They must realize
that the present system runs counter to the country’s long history of
free migration.
In conclusion, the INA should be amended to abandon the
quota framework in favor of a system of natural allocation of visas
based on market principles. Presently, most other parts of the law are
negatively impacted by stresses created by the quota system. American
cultural dedication to sovereignty prevents such a proposal from
succeeding, but more conservative reform efforts would not
adequately address current issues. Therefore, radical change is needed
to reform one particular aspect of the INA: the quotas.

202

See generally OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION, supra note 2 at 1–7.
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